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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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missile defense.  He is currently pursuing a doctorate in project management with Capella University. 
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Abstract 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an international security alliance 
that is also an acquisition organization with 14 separate Agencies that develop, 
procure, or maintain systems for Alliance use. As part of its review of headquarters 
processes and development of a new Strategic Concept, the Secretary General has 
spearheaded an effort to reduce the number of Agencies and reform NATO’s 
acquisition processes. The effort will change organizational structures, governance, 
and delivery of common services for all acquisition efforts. This paper examines this 
reform effort from the standpoint of organizational change and its strategic 
management. It assesses the process of Agency Reform in the context of strategic 
change management and strategy formation. It also examines parallels from 
organizational restructuring of similar magnitude and intent from a policy and 
strategic standpoint.  The examination finds that the academic literature matches 
well with NATO’s efforts, as documented in its record of decisions and working 
papers in the Agency Reform effort, both in its success and shortcomings. 
Introduction 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was the collective security guarantor 
of western democracies for over 50 years, from the end of World War II to the early 21st 
century.  During that time, it developed acquisition and procurement practices to augment 
the equipment and materiel provided by member nations.  The result was a collection of 
semi-autonomous organizations and Agencies developing or procuring the tools of collective 
security, ranging from logistic infrastructure to basic research and development in the 
sciences. 
With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO embarked on a continuing journey of 
strategic change as it shifted the focus of the collective security arrangement from 
containment of a common adversary to diverse missions such as anti-piracy, fighting 
terrorist elements in Afghanistan, and managing an ever-changing relationship with the 
Russian Federation.  This change in mission strategy has generated a collective desire to 
restructure many support functions in the Alliance.  With defense spending declining in most 
member nations, a strategic change in the structure of the acquisition and procurement 
infrastructure was seen as a promising avenue for savings, and in 2010, the Secretary 
General of NATO directed a reduction in the number of acquisition agencies from 14 to 
three. 
This would represent a significant restructuring of NATO’s support infrastructure.  It 
also is being conducted in parallel with the implementation of a new Strategic Concept. The 
decision at the NATO Lisbon Summit was to continue with what had come to be known as 
Agency Reform.  Given the strategic nature of change in the Alliance mission, it is 
reasonable to consider whether parallel strategic change management had been applied to 
the acquisition infrastructure.  The success of the Strategic Concept will depend on NATO’s 
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effectiveness in re-shaping its acquisition and procurement infrastructure, making the latter’s 
implementation and comparison to similar efforts an important study.  A natural first inquiry 
into such a comparison would begin with a research question such as the following: 
What strategic approaches does NATO employ in reforming its acquisition 
infrastructure? 
The question suggests that NATO leadership may be intentionally or unintentionally 
employing existing strategies and approaches for their restructuring effort.  Should that be 
the case, the literature search will be correspondingly rich with comparison opportunities. 
While the main theme is organizational strategic change, the unique international and 
security aspects of NATO are expected to add some insight into strategic organizational 
change that may not be covered in the existing literature. 
This paper begins with a review of selected seminal literature addressing strategy 
formation, strategic management, and organizational change.  After some brief remarks 
regarding methodology, the focus narrows to reviewing the contemporaneous records on 
Agency Reform and noting the highlights of progress from June 2010 to March 2011.  After 
this chronological review is a comparison and contrast with the extant literature on strategy 
formation, strategic management, and organizational change. 
Seminal Literature Review 
The essence of the research question and its context imply literature roots in the 
nature of strategy and it relationship to the structure of an organization.  Article and journal 
research focused on key words and phrases such as strategy formation, strategic 
management, change management, strategic development, and organizational 
development.  From the research of the literature, it appears that the nature of NATO 
restructuring falls under the domains strategy formation, strategic management, and 
organizational development.  Other domains could be constructed, but these three define a 
logical progression of strategy formation driving strategic management, which in turn drives 
organizational development, and much of the literature does appear to fall in these domains. 
Most of the key works in these domains were developed between the mid-50s and 
1985.  Chandler’s (1962) landmark work on the linkage between structure and strategy 
addressed all three domains in four case studies of DuPont, General Motors, Sears, and 
Standard Oil of New Jersey. Each of these organizations underwent major restructuring and 
pioneered some of the forms that are now common in their industry, such as the concept of 
the corporate office, decentralization, and ad hoc reorganization. Using extensive 
longitudinal research, Chandler shows how each of these corporations executed 
organizational development as a result of strategy formation processes and strategic 
management of the new structures.  Chandler closes with a comparative analysis of these 
attempts that analyzes strategy needs with structural outcomes. 
Chandler’s key finding is the link between organizational strategy and structure, with 
the former driving the latter in the cases of Dupont, General Motors, and Standard Oil of 
New Jersey.  Each of these companies expanded and diversified into different product lines 
after World War I and, in doing so, independently settled on what is now called the multi-
divisional form of organizing.  Instead of organizing around functions (e.g., engineering, 
manufacturing, logistics), the now-diversified companies organized around product lines, 
with each product division being a semi-autonomous entity responsible for its own 
operations, profits, and losses.  Another paradigm shift was the invention of the general (or 
corporate) office, which took the place of executive committees.  In the latter concept, line 
responsibility originated with the committee, who directly controlled field activities.  The 
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corporate office concept introduced the concept of an executive body that relinquished line 
authority but worked with staff functions to control company-wide resources and strategy 
development.  
Within NATO, one can see the multi-divisional structure in the organization of the 
headquarters and the Agencies.  There are some important differences.  While most NATO 
Agencies are organized around a specific product or service, there are several that fill purely 
functional roles, such as the Research and Technology Agency. 
While Chandler firmly links strategy and structure, Child (1972) adds the element of 
strategic choice and its effect in strategy formation .  Up to this point, strategy development 
theory had focused on the forces of technology, size of an organization, and structural 
variation.  In reviewing the extant literature and theory, Child acknowledges the power of 
these forces; however, his analysis examines the internal forces of dominant coalitions in an 
organization and their power to shape strategy.  Child notes that dominant coalitions may or 
may not be the same as an organization’s leadership, illustrating the scenario where 
leadership strategic plans may result in a different intended strategy as the effects of 
dominant coalitions are factored into strategy formation (Child, 1972). 
The impact of dominant coalitions cannot be overemphasized in an organization 
such as NATO, which is an inherently political organization with shifting coalitions.  The 
Agencies that are subject to reform are themselves coalitions of subsets to NATO nations, 
some with significant legal and economic power bases.  Child’s model of strategic choice 
would appear to be a logical starting point in any study of a political organization’s strategy 
formation and organizational change. 
Strategic choice and its interplay with environment and dominant coalitions is the 
essence of Mintzberg’s (1979) strategy-by-learning paradigm.  Mintzberg makes explicit the 
idea of planned versus emergent strategies in addressing the strategy formation, 
organizational development, and strategic management domains .  This research looks at 
the strategic arc of the U.S. escalation in Vietnam and the evolution of the German 
automaker Volkswagen during roughly the same time period (1950–1973).  The case 
studies indicate periods of relatively stable strategic direction punctuated by changes in 
strategic direction, either by deliberate planning or through emergent and adaptive 
strategies.  In both cases, there is a period of strategic drift (“groping”) where bureaucratic 
inertia drives the enterprise and incremental strategy changes are the norm, often without 
regard to longer-term goals.  Mintzberg also makes an explicit comment on the then-
predominant form of strategy development (the Planning School) by indicating that strategy 
development isolated from implementation factors will almost always mean a strategy that is 
out of synchronization with the environment. 
Mintzberg introduces the paradigm of strategy development as a learning exercise 
by the organization, as opposed to Chandler’s concept of strategy as a planning activity by a 
corporate office. He elaborates on the ad hoc approach to strategy development 
(“adhocracy”) in a longitudinal analysis of data from the National Film Board (NFB) of 
Canada.  Mintzberg reviews some of the styles of strategy formation already referenced in 
related research (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) and then focuses on an interpretation of 
historical data gathered from the NFB.  Throughout its history, the NFB displays a number of 
approaches to strategy, from the entrepreneurial (in its early days) to the overarching 
umbrella type, where guidance was general and filmmakers had generous latitude for 
project selection.  The article notes how the NFB periodically varied its strategic approach, 
primarily through grassroots initiatives that mostly represented an adhocracy (i.e., 
producers, directors, and technical specialists collaborating on individual projects and then 
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disbanding upon completion) instead of stable production units and linked functional 
organizations. 
The value of this article is that it is a quantitative study of historical data showing a 
relationship between the external environment and the strategic actions of an organization.  
This is a departure from the other literature mentioned in this paper in that it has a distinct 
quantitative flavor in contrast to the theoretical and exploratory efforts documented in the 
other cited works.  Mintzberg gathers and examines archival data on the number of films 
produced as well as sponsorship, type of film, and business context of the NFB.  The history 
of NATO acquisition and its approaches have also varied throughout the years in response 
to the will of the Alliance members and the external environment.  This article may be a 
useful comparison when a similar history of NATO acquisition is researched and 
documented. 
Porter (1980) puts forward the idea of strategy as a position within an industrial 
arena with his 1980 book.  This work extensively covers the three domains, articulating the 
“Five Forces” within any given industry market (power of suppliers, power of customers, 
barriers to entry of new competitors, threat of substitute products and services, and intra-
industry rivalries) that drive a competitor in that industry to achieve a stable place in the 
market from which it can be successful.  The book casts strategic management as adopting 
generic strategies consistent with the Position School of strategy development (e.g., cost 
leadership verses differentiation) and discusses strategic analysis and decision-making with 
the goal of an organization optimizing its position.  The applications to NATO’s acquisition 
restructuring at first appear to be limited, since one could consider NATO a monopolistic 
player in the western security marketplace; however, it is important to note that NATO faces 
a quasi-rival in the European Union (EU) with respect to international security.  Two of 
Porter’s Five Forces are barriers to entry of new competitors and threat of substitutes.  The 
presence of the EU, and its aspirations, places NATO’s Agency Reform efforts as perhaps 
closer to Porter’s framework than it would be apparent on first inspection. 
Table 1 summarizes the examination of the seminal literature, reviewing the domains 
addressed, the literature’s methodology, its research type, and the emergent paradigm from 
the seminal work. 
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Table 1. Seminal Research in Organizational Strategic Change 
Author, Year Domain Methodology Research Type Paradigm








































































Among the research domains one can see similarities among the seminal literature.  
Most rely on archival data and longitudinal study in arriving at their findings.  This is perhaps 
not surprising if one subscribes to the idea that strategic change is rare and only 
implemented when forces dictate.  The nature of those forces is where the real debates lie.  
The paradigms developed from these studies offer a researcher a wide variety of theoretical 
lenses through which to view structural change at NATO. 
Method 
This study is exploratory in that it attempts to determine the strategic themes driving 
NATO’s Agency Reform.  The source documents are records from meetings and selected 
interviews.  The source documents are not comprehensive, but they are selected for 
relevance to the overall strategic nature of the reform (e.g., decision sheets of significant 
meetings, presentations of primary subjects regarding reform options, directives from the 
Secretary General and senior NATO staff, and written remarks from nations).  The written 
record of the decisions and the objective articulation of the alternatives and rationale are 
then compared to the literature of strategy formation and strategic management, from which 
one can assess the nature of NATO’s strategic change.  Source documents considered 
were generated between June 2010 and March 2011.  During this time, there were three 
key meetings of either Defense Ministers (October 2010 and March 2011) or Heads of State 
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or Government (HoSG) (November 2010).  At these points, the written record becomes 
stable, since reports at these meetings are a consensus agreement among nations. 
Interviews were conducted sparingly.  In a more comprehensive qualitative study, 
interviews with principal and minor actors would be significant sources.  Since Agency 
Reform is current and ongoing, the actions are intensely political within NATO, and objective 
opinions can be difficult to find because many of the potential interviewees have significant 
equity in the outcome of the reform.  The political nature of NATO and the Agency Reform 
process make for challenging analysis.  They are subject to revision and clarification.  
Moreover, the record of decisions and working papers only tells a partial story, since 
informal conversations and meetings can add significant nuance and shading to the official 
record. 
Another significant factor is the nature of NATO itself.  It is primarily a mutual security 
organization, and the concern there is reasonable concern that this aspect may have more 
influence on reorganization than would be expected from theoretical constructs or results 
from research.  Fortunately, the focus of reorganization is on the business aspects of 
NATO—acquisition, procurement, support, common services, and maintenance.  Here there 
is congruity with the extant research on organizational change and strategic management.  
The primary drivers for change in NATO—normalization of structure, efficiencies in linkages 
and costs, and harmonization with NATO headquarters structures—are similar to reasons 
cited by commercial entities for strategic change (Chandler, 1962; NATO Secretary General 
Private Office, 2010).  This aspect of NATO’s reorganization makes it possible to address 
the stated research question with some confidence. 
Context and Progress of NATO Agency Reform 
NATO’s agency structure has steadily evolved over the 60-year history of the 
Alliance as its procurement, maintenance, and logistic needs have grown.  Currently, there 
are 14 NATO Agencies in seven nations.  Overall employment is 6,000 people, with a 
business volume of €10 billion.  Approximately €8 billion is provided by nations participating 
in these agencies.  Table 2 identifies the Agencies and describes their functions. 
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Table 2. NATO Agencies 
Agency Description Business Function 
Central European Pipeline 
Management Agency (CEPMA) 
Manages petroleum pipelines for 
NATO use in central Europe Support, Logistics 
NATO Air Command and Control 
System Management Agency 
(NACMA) 
Design, development, and 
deployment of next-generation 
NATO aircraft C2 system 
Acquisition, Procurement 
NATO Airborne Early Warning and 
Control Programme Agency 
(NAPMA) 
Management of NATO airborne 
early warning aircraft and 
associated upgrades 
Acquisition, Procurement, Support, 
Maintenance 
NATO Alliance Ground 
Surveillance Management Agency 
(NAGSMA) 
Development of NATO unmanned 
intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance aircraft
Acquisition, Procurement 
NATO Battlefield Information, 
Collection and Exploitation System 
(BICES) 
Development and procurement of 
battlefield intelligence networks Acquisition, Procurement 
NATO Communication and 
Information Systems Services 
Agency (NCSA) 
Support and maintenance of 
deployed networks Support, Maintenance 
NATO Medium Extended Air 
Defence System Agency 
(NAMEADSMA) 
Development, acquisition, and 
procurement of ground-based 
medium-range air defense system
Acquisition, Procurement 
NATO Eurofighter and Tornado 
Management Agency (NETMA) 
Management of Eurofighter and 
Tornado aircraft within NATO Support, Maintenance 
NATO Consultation, Command and 
Control Agency (NC3A) 
Development, procurement, and 




NATO Helicopter Management 
Agency (NAHEMA) 
Management of NATO helicopter 
assets Maintenance, Logistics 
NATO Maintenance and Supply 
Agency (NAMSA) Logistic support to NATO systems  Logistics 
NATO Airlift Management Agency 
(NAMA) 
Management of heavy fixed-wing 
airlift capability Maintenance, Logistics 
NATO Standardization Agency 
(NSA) Standards development Support 
Research & Technology Agency 
(RTA) 
Harmonization of Allies research 
and technology efforts Research 
 
Table 2 indicates that the NATO Agencies perform a mix of services in support of the 
NATO mission.  Some, such as NACMA and NAGSMA, are focused on development of 
specific systems and capabilities and may have only limited influence on support, logistics, 
and maintenance.  Others, such as NAMSA and CEPMA, have a heavy logistics focus, 
while Agencies such as NSA and RTA are functionally oriented. 
Agency funding varies across the entities.  It is important to note that not all 28 
nations participate in all the Agencies, nor are all the Agencies equally supported by what is 
colloquially known as “common funding,” where all 28 nations make contributions to the 
NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) to fund common needs.  Funding is often 
determined by the governance structure of the Agency itself, which also varies depending 
on the participants and the legal/political framework adopted at Agency inception. 
The Agencies function as virtually autonomous entities, managing their personnel 
and delivering services with little or no direction from NATO headquarters staff.  They each 
have their own personnel, budget, and information technology systems.  Some support 
separate contracting and legal services.  Most have some form of a Board of Directors or 
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equivalent oversight body that directs the Agency from a strategic level.  All have some 
reporting and responsibility link to the North Atlantic Council (NAC). 
Summary of Agency Reform Initiative: June 2010–March 2011 
The subject of Agency Reform is not new.  It had been discussed, often in 
conjunction with the NATO Command Structure (NCS) in Summit meetings and various 
Defense and Foreign Ministers’ meetings over the last 10 years.  The latest effort was given 
substantial support by the Secretary General in 2010.  This section provides a summary of 
this effort from June 2010 to March 2011. 
June 2010 Defense Ministers’ Meeting—November 2010 Lisbon Summit 
The Secretary General described the essence of his intended Agency Reform and 
articulated the expected achievements: (1) maximum effectiveness and efficiency, (2) 
maximum sharing of support services, (3) improved governance, transparency, and 
accountability, (4) greater synergy among similar functions, and (5) savings (NATO 
Secretary General Private Office, 2010).  Table 3 shows the Secretary General’s initial 
portfolio construct of the three consolidated Agencies. 




Research and Development Transportation Command structure support
Air Command and Control Pipelines Support to Operations
Airborne Early Warning Weapon Systems Intelligence Sharing
Alliance Ground Surveillance Infrastructure Cyber Security 
Eurofighter and Tornado 
 
NATO helicopter for the 90s 
Medium Air Defense 
Standardization 
 
The original concept was for three Agencies rationalized along the lines of 
Procurement, Support, and Communications and Information Systems (CIS).  Individual 
programs would initially be managed under the Procurement Agency and would eventually 
transition to the Support Agency.  Upgrades to existing systems would involve a temporary 
transition back to Procurement and eventual repatriation back to Support once upgrades 
were tested and fielded.  The original timetable indicated a decision by Defense Ministers on 
the basics of Agency Reform by their October 2010 meeting.  A savings target of 20% was 
articulated. 
Activity on Agency Reform was minimal during the summer of 2010; however, in the 
fall, the Defense Policy and Planning Committee for Agency Reform (DPPC/AR) began to 
consider preliminary ideas and proposals from the NATO Agency Reform Team (NART).  
Records from the fall of 2010 indicate some concerns about meeting the Secretary 
General’s October mandate given the complexity of the “as is” situation and emerging 
questions about the higher-level governance, particularly the desire to put the NAC in more 
direct control of the Agencies (DPPC/AR, 2010a).  Through October the DPPC/AR and the 
NART developed governance frameworks as depicted in Figures 1, 2, and 3. 
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Figure 1. Proposed Agency Governance Framework 
(DPPC/AR, 2010c) 
Figure 1 depicts overall NAC control through an Agency Supervisory Board (ASB) 
with representatives of the 28 Allies and a direct report Agency General Manager 
overseeing program coordination and the staff financial, information technology, and 
resource control functions.  An Agency Management Advisory Committee with populated by 
senior NATO staff coordinates with the ASB and the General Manager.  Individual programs 
report up through program coordination while their individual boards retain local governance 
of their respective programs. 
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Figure 2. 1st Alternate Governance Framework 
(DPPC/AR, 2010c) 
Figure 2 is very similar to Figure 1, except that the existing Senior Policy 
Committee(s) replaces the ASB, where Allies are already represented.  This option appears 
to use existing committees to perform an oversight role instead of organizing a new body to 
oversee Agency operations. 
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Figure 3. 2nd Alternate Governance Framework 
(DPPC/AR, 2010c) 
Figure 3 is a variant of those structures depicted in Figures 1 and 2; however, here 
the program boards are shown in a coordination role instead of a direct report and line 
configuration.  Here, the General Manager of the Agency is in control of the program offices 
while the program boards exercise some level of oversight.  This would represent a 
significant shift in governance, replacing the program boards—existing stakeholders—with a 
newly hired General Manager. 
Lisbon Summit Report—November 2010 
NATO opted for a three-Agency model consisting of Procurement, Support, and CIS, 
all supported by a Shared Services provider.  Figure 4 is from the report to Heads of State 
and Government (HoSG) at the November Lisbon Summit (DPPC/AR, 2010e). 
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Figure 4. Conceptual View of the Three-Agency Construct 
(DPPC/AR, 2010e) 
Figure 4 shows a more informed view of which functions would reside in the new 
Agencies and represents a progression in thought and detail over the Secretary General’s 
original division articulated in Table 3.  Shared Services clearly show the common linkage 
and expected efficiencies of vis-à-vis reduced redundancy in services.  There is an 
interaction between the Procurement and Support Agencies represented by logical 
transitions between Procurement and Support, depending on the status (e.g., either 
“upgrade” or “in-service”). 
Governance was perhaps the most contentious of issues.  Here, the differing nature, 
funding mechanisms, and legal frameworks of the Agencies became apparent, since it was 
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clear that no single governance structure could be agreed for all the Agencies and their 
programs.  The Lisbon report indicated that detailed governance implementation will require 
further work before Agency governance as a whole could be rationalized.  Figure 5 
describes a governance model for the Shared Services and CIS Agencies, but as a practical 
matter, this would also serve for the Procurement and Support Agencies. 
 
Figure 5. Basic Governance Model Given at Lisbon Summit (November 2010) 
(DPPC/AR, 2010e) 
This model is very similar to Figures 1 and 2, showing program boards reporting 
through the Agency General Managers and ASB to the NAC.  This model would apply to the 
CIS Agency from its inception.  Application to the Procurement and Support Agencies was 
problematic because of the varied governance structures for these programs, although a 
close examination of Figures 1, 2, and 5 show little difference at the highest level of 
abstraction.  The Agencies would report through some sort of intermediary board and liaise 
with the individual program boards for day-to-day oversight of the programs.  Shared 
Services governance would be handled through the NATO Assistant Secretary General for 
Executive Management (ASG/EM). 
Perhaps the major revelation in the Lisbon report was the recognition of “specific 
cases” that did not fit readily into the Procurement/Support/CIS paradigm.  The RTA, BICES, 
and NSA qualified as specific cases and could be readily accommodated as exceptions.  
The RTA dealt with basic science, the BICES with unique battlefield intelligence, and the 
NSA with standards development.  The nature of communications provision and support—
already proposed as a new, consolidated agency—represented a unique challenge because 
its influence affected all CIS from military operations to headquarters services.  Because of 
this relation to the NCS, it was identified as a unique case requiring careful scrutiny.  The 
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HoSG directed NATO to move forward with their Agency Reform agenda and report their 
progress to Defense Ministers in March and June 2011. 
Post-Lisbon Activities 
After Lisbon, attention turned to the business case analyses of the three Agencies 
and four specific cases.  The DPPC/AR and NART also considered the qualifications for the 
Agency General Manager (DPPC/AR, 2010b; DPPC/AR, 2010d), emphasizing that the new 
General Manager would need to possess expertise in organizational change management. 
Initial business cases were put forward in February 2011.  From contemporary 
documents, it appears that the development of the business cases raised a number of 
questions that had not been considered prior to the Lisbon Summit.  The development 
teams indicated the following: 
The cases are incomplete but provide important additional layers of detail on the 
“as is situation” and offer options for the “to be situation”.  More importantly they 
raise questions in a number of important areas, such as the issues need to be 
addressed by nations sooner than later in order to identify the way forward which 
best achieves the objectives set out in our report to the Heads of State and 
Government in Lisbon (PO(2010)0159). (DPPC/AR, 2011c) 
While the initial outline for business cases were nominally sufficient for making 
organizational decisions, it is clear that the results were incomplete, particularly with respect 
to cost and benefit analysis.  Nevertheless, it is informative to review the structural options 
developed for the Procurement, Support, CIS, and Shared Services constructs. 
Procurement Agency 
The analysis team described three options: (1) a coordinated but decentralized 
approach where the Procurement General Manager has a corporate staff but program 
directors have unfettered access to program boards; (2) a centralized approach where all 
reporting from program directors is achieved through the office of the Procurement General 
Manager; and (3) a decentralized, uncoordinated approach where the Procurement General 
Manager is responsible for delivering Shared Services.  The NART recommended the first 
option as the best balanced among the three options.  This option is shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Procurement Agency Option 1 
(DPPC/AR, 2011f) 
The Option 1 structure is in line with the previously articulated structures of Figures 1 
and 4.  The General Manager has a loose association with the programs and their boards 
while having a direct reporting responsibility to an ASB.  The General Manager has limited 
leverage on the programs and makes very little change in their governance structures.  
While it complies with the Lisbon mandate, the structure resembles a fairly loose 
confederation of acquisition programs instead of the more defined governance structure 
articulated in Figure 4. 
Support Agency 
The NART also recommended three options for the new Support Agency: (1) a new 
corporate framework integrating all support Agencies into newly-rationalized divisions, 
taking maximum advantage of the new Shared Services organization and incorporating best 
practices and all aspects of the Lisbon mandate; (2) a framework featuring a fully integrated 
executive level and decentralized operations and program activities (in this option, individual 
program operations and methods of delivering services remain the same but program 
oversight is achieved through a loose, federated framework); and (3) the “as is” situation, 
with no attempt to alter Agency structures.  The new General Manager would have a staff, 
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but current reporting and authority lines would remain the same.  For illustration, Option 1 is 
given in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Support Agency Option 1 
(DPPC/AR, 2011f) 
There was no recommendation in this source with respect to a preferred option.  This 
option bears a strong resemblance to Figures 1 and 4.  It shows perhaps a stronger line 
authority over the incorporated support Agencies and displays a clear division between line 
authority (the programs) and staff functions (business management and financial control).  
The General Manager has more direct oversight and reports to the NAC through an ASB.  
CIS Agency 
The organizational options for the CIS were arguably the most complex because its 
domain spanned everything from headquarters IT services to battlefield communications.  
Its structure and staffing were closely intertwined with the parallel NCS reformation, which 
was addressing its geographic and personnel footprint.  As a result, the CIS organization 
had the greatest number of stakeholders and elicited the most comments and concerns of 
all the Agency Reform efforts. 
The NART developed three conceptual options that are decidedly less detailed than 
those of the Procurement and Support Agency models.  In part, this would appear to be 
because of the complexity involved in generating detailed organizational charts without 
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consensus about the higher-level conceptual model.  The options addressed are (1) an 
“NCS Light” model whereby a Communications and Intelligence (C&I) Agency holds and 
operates all command, control, and communications (C3) systems except for deployed 
communications systems that would be under the authority of Allied Command Operations 
(ACO); (2) a “Single Agency” model representing a completely rationalized and consolidated 
C3 Agency; and (3) an “NCS Heavy” model where the operational command structure takes 
on more C3 responsibilities and ownership with a proportionately increased( i.e., “heavier”) 
staffing requirement from the NCS.  The source documentation used for this analysis does 
not record a specific recommendation, although the NART notes that the NCS Light model 
appears to represent the best balance of return on investment in structural change, 
differentiation of responsibilities, and acceptance by the main stakeholder, ACO (DPPC/AR, 
2011c).  The NCS Light model is shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. NCS Light Model for CIS Agency 
(DPPC/AR, 2011b) 
The CIS model is decidedly less defined than those of the Procurement and Support 
Agencies, reflecting the complexity of the CIS challenge.  The CIS model is more 
conceptual, in part because of the number of organizations and functions involved.  It is 
significant that at this stage of discussion, the model does not address the placement of 
programs so much as the intersection of stakeholders (i.e., NATO headquarters, 
requirements developers, and Allied Command Operations [ACO]) and the functions to be 
delivered. 
Office of Shared Services (OSS) 
Of the reform initiative examined by the NART, the concept of sharing support 
services (e.g., human resources, finance/accounting, general procurement, information 
technology, and facilities management) was perhaps the least contentious.  In part, this 
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could be due to the fact that these functions had no powerful invested stakeholders and the 
recognition by all involved in Agency Reform that sharing services would have the most 
immediate impact on achieving cost efficiencies.  Perhaps for these reasons, the OSS 
analysis was more complete in terms of implementation details.  The articulated strategy 
would be to locate the Head of OSS under the Assistant Secretary General for Executive 
Management (ASG/EM) and develop coordination cells with the Procurement, Support, and 
CIS Agencies.  The proposed governance structure is the same as the one shown in Figure 
4, and there was no further articulation of organizational structure in the source 
documentation. 
Recognized Risks 
The NART identified a number of general risks, including lack of executive 
sponsorship, insufficient funding for transitioning to a new structure, and professional 
cultural resistance to the inevitable new processes. 
National Reactions 
Nations immediately assessed the business cases and noted that the format and 
content were not sufficient to render a clear decision on the final structure of Agency 
Reform.  One nation commented on the initial business cases as follows: 
The arguments for why a specific option is preferable are not clearly laid out and 
must be refined.  The risk analysis must be presented in greater detail, 
particularly as concerns the legal aspects, and it must be included in the various 
options. (DPPC/AR, 2011d) 
The above generally reflected the feelings of most nations.  The decision sheet of the  
February 11, 2011, meeting of the DPPC/AR noted that the business cases needed “to be 
completed with a thorough financial analysis, including pros and cons for all options offered 
together with risks evaluation and mitigation measures to enable nations to take an informed 
decision” (DPPC/AR, 2011e). 
Report to Defense Ministers—March 2011 Meeting 
By February 2011 it was evident that the Agency Reform timetable sought by the 
Secretary General was slipping, due mainly to the sheer complexity of rationalizing and 
normalizing the functions and services of the 14 Agencies into an arbitrary three Agencies.  
Already there were major issues with legal frameworks and stakeholders in the Procurement 
and CIS Agency efforts, while continuity of service and uncertainty about the geographic 
footprint was a primary concern with the Support Agency effort.  Shared Services appeared 
to be the least contentious of the reform initiatives because its strategy was to initiate small 
reforms and grow them to achieve the overall Shared Services concept.  The hosting issue 
was also less contentious, since Shared Services would reside in the ASG/EM organization. 
By this time, the original Agency Reform concepts had matured in response to 
stakeholder realities and desires.  While there were three Agencies proposed (Procurement, 
Support, and CIS), supported by an OSS, there were additional organizational constructs to 
accommodate the unique situations of CIS, Intelligence Sharing, research and technology, 
and standardization.  The report to Defense Ministers noted that key issues remain with 
regard to Agency governance, funding, transfer of functions, identification of shared services 
for the OSS, and the transition of legal frameworks for those programs established under 
unique international agreements. 
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The next section examines NATO’s progress through the lens of strategy formation, 
strategic management, and organizational change. 
Discussion 
The Agency Reform process at NATO continues, but at this point, there is sufficient 
documentation to examine the progress with some findings from research.  The above 
narrative highlights many interesting themes on strategic change (e.g., the role of senior 
leadership, stakeholder management, and professional subcultures) but the following 
discussion will focus on the rationale for Agency Reform, the preferred structures developed 
by the NART, and commentary on strategy formation and strategic management. 
Rationale for Agency Reform 
The idea of Agency Reform is not new, but this instantiation developed in a very 
short time frame and articulated by the Secretary General in the middle of 2010.  This is not 
in itself unusual.  The DuPont Corporation, Standard Oil of New Jersey, and General Motors 
all initiated their seminal reorganizations at roughly the same time in the early 20th century 
(Chandler, 1962), in relatively short order.  The rationale for their reorganizations was not so 
different than NATO’s: rationalization, harmonization, and improved efficiency.  The 
difference between Chandler’s case studies and NATO’s situation is influence of external 
factors.  DuPont reorganized to better utilize plant capacity after the First World War.  
Standard Oil of New Jersey was grappling with the increased demand for gasoline and 
branching out into new products.  General Motors comes closest to the NATO rationale in 
that it had to transform itself from a confederation of parts and sub-assembly suppliers to a 
more coherent structure. 
Normally, the need for strategic change is brought about through a change in overall 
strategy or because of misalignment between the organization and its environment (Miller & 
Friesen, 1983).  NATO’s Agency Reform was not driven by any misalignment per se but was 
based on the desire for a more direct line of authority and reporting and reaping efficiencies 
through elimination of redundancies. The extant documentation cites no pressing rationale 
for Agency Reform; however, the rationale could be the implicit concern for finances 
stemming from the worldwide fiscal difficulties of 2008 and onward.  NATO’s strategic 
concept has undergone regular updating in response to a changing security environment 
(NATO, 2011).  The NATO business structure of the Agencies has not received similar 
attention over the years, but that may be because of the relative fiscal stability of NATO until 
quite recently. 
Strategy Formation and Strategic Change Management 
Organizations usually have predictable preferences of strategy formation, often 
correlated with the size and structure of the organization. The literature on the relation 
between structure and strategy is extensive.  Mintzberg’s study on the NFB of Canada 
describes several strategies and organizational structures from the NFB’s establishment in 
1939 to 1975, noting that its preferred strategy formation over that time was one of 
emergence while its most effective structure was one of ad hoc work groups and project 
teams (an “adhocracy” [Mintzberg & McHugh, 1985]), indicating that strategies and 
organizational structures can and do change.  In the performance dimension, there appears 
to be a relation between strategy and structure, although the causality is an open question.  
Based on complexity of the environment, use of rational and analytic tools, and the degree 
to which strategy formation is centralized, there appear to be 10 archetypes of successful 
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and trouble-prone business profiles (Miller & Friesen, 1977).  All of these 10 archetypical 
configurations have the distinct elements of prescriptive strategy formulation (e.g., design, 
planning, entrepreneurial, and positioning) and descriptive strategy formation such as 
learning and contingency.  Earlier research characterizes the strategy/structure/performance 
relation as one of adaptation of an organization’s structure to implement a strategy while 
normalizing and rationalizing its administrative operations (Miles, Snow, Meyer, & Coleman, 
1978).  From this, Miles was able to develop the Defender, Prospector, Analyzer, and 
Reactor typologies of organizations.  These represent different strategic approaches, which 
appear to correlate with organizational structures.  Defender organizations often are 
mechanistic and defend certain market niches, while Prospector organizations tend to be 
more organic and focus on finding new niches.  Analyzers often have a foot in each world, 
while Reactors simply react to the environment and have no set strategy. 
NATO’s existing size and structure, similar to a General Motors or DuPont, is very 
bureaucratic and mechanistic, which favors top-down strategic management initiatives, 
rationale, and the “Planning School” of strategy formation (Miller, 1986; Mintzberg, 
Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 1998).  Using Miles’ (1978) descriptive archetypes, it would appear 
that NATO displays a Defender approach, which is consistent with its large, entrenched 
structure.  Large, mechanistic organizations such as NATO will often use a linear style of 
developing strategy, usually by articulating a goal and developing implementation plans for 
execution by the organization.  Smaller companies, or those with a looser structure, may 
engage in a more interpretive approach, where the environment external to the organization 
may take on different meaning and significance to the array of stakeholders involved in 
strategy formation and strategic change.  Other organizations may use an adaptive 
approach and develop their strategy by continuous organizational learning (Chaffee, 1985; 
Mintzberg et al., 1998; Mintzberg, 1978;  Mintzberg et al., 1985). 
NATO has clearly adopted a linear strategy for its Agency Reform, starting with a 
definitive set of goals and a distinct idea regarding the end state (NATO Secretary General 
Private Office, 2010).  While not explicitly stated in the documentation, it is clear that the 
primary goal was to lower Agency costs and foster better accountability and control of the 
Agencies.  It appears that these goals were developed almost exclusively by the Secretary 
General’s staff with little initial consultation with key stakeholders, notably the senior 
leadership of the Agencies and the nations that selectively participate in some Agencies.  
The strategy formation approach was one of careful planning, initially in relative isolation 
and later with increasingly wider involvement with stakeholders.  This last approach was 
corroborated in confidential, informal interviews with key participants; it became clear that 
the reform goals were generated almost exclusively from the Secretary General’s Private 
Office, with little outside input (Interviewee 1, personal communication, February 2011; 
Interviewee 2, personal communication, March 2011). 
This form of strategy formation can be problematic.  Without significant support from 
key stakeholders and the target organizations, the success of reform efforts can be greatly 
diminished.  An organization’s leadership can certainly exercise strategic choice on strategy 
formation; however, such actions can quickly generate responses from significant political 
coalitions within an organization (Child, 1972).  Strategies formed in the absence of 
stakeholder and coalition involvement during the early stages often run into significant 
implementation difficulties in the later stages (Dibb, 2005; Noble et al., 1999).  Leadership 
will often craft strategic goals, or even whole strategies, from a narrow perspective that may 
preclude efficient execution by the rest of the organization (Piercy & Morgan, 1993). 
Cespedes (1996) notes that schism between the marketing function and the rest of 
the organization can doom implementation from many quarters, through inertia, myopic 
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corporate vision, active resistance at the mid-management level, and different business 
processes and standards in the same organization.  This phenomenon is not limited to 
marketing functions.  The lack of coordination starts at the top of an organization when 
mission and vision statements are not communicated and carried down throughout the 
organization.  Simply put, strategy formation and strategic management must be consistent 
with an organization’s mission and vision for any chance of effective implementation 
(McDonald, 2006; Piercy et al., 1993; Smith, 2003; Weinstein, 2006; Wind, 1978; Wind & 
Robertson, 1983). 
Another problematic aspect of this approach is the engagement of subcultures during 
strategic changes.  This is an extension of Child’s findings on how strategic choice at the top 
of an organization often requires strategic compromise with dominant coalitions within the 
organization itself, leading to a “satisficing” condition as leadership’s goals are modulated by 
internal influences (Child, 1972).  Research on the nature of these dominant coalitions 
indicates that they always exist in large organizations and are usually a function of 
professional affiliation, geography, ethnicities, and national cultures.  Often these 
subcultures have influence and leverage that extend beyond organizational boundaries.  
The organizational culture, and its component subcultures, needs to be considered 
because they provide much of the energy behind the internal forces already cited.  The 
literature indicate that organizations of any significant size will subdivide into groups as new 
entrants seek to learn legitimate and acceptable behaviors in their new environment (Bloor 
& Dawson, 1994).  Organizational sub-groupings appear to be inevitable and often fall along 
predictable lines such as production and support (Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, & Sanders, 
1990; Hofstede, 1998).  In professional organizations, these sub-groupings are often bound 
by professional or work-related parameters (e.g., lawyers, engineers, or “middle 
management”).  As such, they usually have norms, ethics, standards, and codes of conduct 
that bind them together and sometimes extend across organizational lines (Hansen, 1995; 
Hofstede et al., 1990; Marks & Scholarios, 2007).  The organization’s leadership depends 
on the subcultures because of the utility they bring; however, studies show that the 
commitment and alignment of the subcultures with the greater organizational goals can vary 
across the spectrum, from supportive to neutral to antithetical, even in an outwardly 
harmonious body (Denison & Mishra, 1995; Hansen, 1995; Jermier, Slocum, Fry, & Gaines, 
1991; Lok, Westwood, & Crawford, 2005).  In re-visiting Noble & Mokwa’s (1999) study, for 
example, it was clear that middle managers, as a distinct subculture, were necessary for the 
success of a marketing implementation strategy. 
NATO is an organization of subcultures of every type.  The Agencies themselves are 
subcultures because of their organizational distance from NATO headquarters, developed 
over 60 years of evolution.  Most nations are Alliance members, although a few are not. The 
varying array of nations represents significant subcultures and stakeholders.  Professional 
subcultures are everywhere, from the development and procurement organizations such as 
NAGSMA and NAPMA to the purely logistic and functional organizations such as CEPMA 
and RTA. 
Analysis 
From the sources reviewed, it can be seen that the Agency Reform experience at 
NATO is consistent with empirical research.  The process started with the most senior 
direction in the organization, and initial strategies were formed in relative isolation by the 
NART.  As more stakeholders were exposed to the work in progress, there came significant 
discussion and somewhat late input as these same stakeholders learned more about the 
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NART’s plans.  Many stakeholders posed valid questions regarding the strategic goals and 
requested some analytic underpinning for reducing the number of Agencies from 14 to 
three.  These business cases, which would have had more utility at the start of the process, 
were finally developed in February 2011, more than six months after the Secretary General 
articulated the Agency Reform initiative.  It is significant to note that the initial drafts of the 
business cases list implementation risks that are consistent with the empirical work on 
strategic change management.  Figure 9, excerpted from a NART working paper, highlights 
the main reasons for change failures in organizations. 
 
Figure 9. Why Transformations Fail 
(DPPC/AR, 2011a) 
At some point in the Agency Reform process, it was clear that the significant change 
management issues were the social and organizational aspects—the “soft” issues—instead 
of the technical challenges of reorganizing information technology structures or lines of 
reporting and authority.  Mindsets, attitudes, cultures, perseverance, and complexity are the 
main impediments to strategic change.  This should not be too surprising.  Strategy is the 
gyroscope of an organization, and its purpose is to keep an organization oriented to its 
broadest goals.  This orientation molds attitudes and cultures.  Strategic change is a major 
re-focusing of an organization and its essence is deciding what an organization will—and 
will not—do with its resources. 
By this time, however, the distinct subcultures in the Agencies had mobilized to put 
forward alternative strategies.  The strategic goals of reducing the number of Agencies from 
14 to three and achieving 20% efficiencies was modified somewhat to a plan involving three 
large Agencies (Procurement, Support, and CIS), an office of Shared Services, and four 
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special cases involving unique functional areas.  The overall goal of 20% savings across the 
new Agencies now appears to be a goal primarily invested in the OSS. 
The business cases should have rationalized the strategy formation process, but 
because they were incomplete, they were not as useful as they could have been.  At their 
meeting in March 2011, the Defense Ministers gave direction to develop more 
comprehensive business cases.  At this point, their utility is significantly diminished, since 
they are no longer able to frame the strategic debate or contribute to strategy formation.  
Their most effective role now is one of confirmation and providing detail for implementation 
plans. 
Table 4 discusses some of the key strategy items necessary for strategic change in 
an organization and a comparison between NATO Agency Reform and the empirical 
research in the literature. 
Table 4. NATO Agency Reform and Strategic Change Research 
Strategy Item Function NATO Agency Reform 
Strategic Change 
Research 
Business Case Analysis  Provides rationale and 
analytic underpinning for 
strategy formation and 
strategic change
Business cases developed 
late in the Agency Reform 
process 
Ideally developed in 
advance of strategic 
goal formation 
Strategic Goal 
Development Develops the strategic goals for later 
implementation; represents 
major shift in strategy 
Specific goals developed 
primarily by Secretary 
General, as informed by 





with all stakeholders 
Stakeholder Consultation Involves stakeholders early 
in the strategy formation 
process; stakeholders are 
internal and external and 
come from all levels 
Occurred relatively late in 
the process; specific goals 
and work toward 





strategic goals for 






stakeholder Not considered 
Should be included 
as a key stakeholder
Communication Approach 
Communicates progress of 
strategic change with 
affected stakeholders 
Communication occurs late 








Translates strategy and 
goals into plans for 
organizational change 
Occurring at the end of 
business case analysis; 
already being developed 
for OSS 
Occurs after strategy 
formation and with 
input from 
stakeholders; 




Monitoring Collection of metrics to 
determine effectiveness of 
change efforts 
Planned for two years from 
completion of Agency 
Reform; metrics yet to be 
developed
Monitoring is regular 
and timely 
 
From Table 4, it would appear that the NATO Agency Reform effort has executed the 
key strategy items but in a somewhat different order and at variance with research on 
successful strategic change efforts.  Significant are the relatively late development of 
business cases and the relatively early articulation of the specific strategic goals in the 
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Agency Reform process.  The order is reversed from what the research literature indicates 
in successful approaches.  The role of the business cases is to inform the strategic goals, 
and the reversed order of these items effectively prevented that.  By the time they made 
their appearance in February 2011, many stakeholders and cultural elements had already 
expressed considerable concern about Agency Reform and had forwarded their own 
agenda.  Also significant is the relative isolation in which the strategic goals were formed.  In 
contrast, the literature indicate that the most successfully implemented strategic goals are 
ones that are founded on the analytic findings of business cases and developed through 
extensive consultation with key stakeholders.  The internal organizational cultural influences 
also appeared to have been misjudged in developing a new Agency strategy.  Its effect is 
clear in that several organizations were successful in arguing for unique treatment in Agency 
Reform that changed the paradigm of all Agencies merging into one of three consolidated 
entities. 
Conclusions 
The research question of this paper inquired as to NATO’s strategic approach in 
pursuing Agency Reform.  Despite the fact that it is a unique security organization involving 
28 sovereign nations, its approach to reforming its procurement and acquisition 
infrastructure appears to be similar to industrial organizations of similar size.  The strategic 
approach was one of top-down mandate, consistent with large mechanistic organizations 
structured in a multi-divisional format.  The strategic process appeared to be one of 
essential strategy formation at the top leadership level, a period of socialization, and then 
engagement with stakeholders and development of business cases.  Implementation is 
expected to follow in the coming year. 
It is conceivable that this effort could have been conducted more efficiently had there 
been some consideration to the empirical research on strategic change management.  This 
is not to say that NATO is failing to achieve its stated goals, but the executed process 
arguably has lengthened the task and perhaps unnecessarily introduced controversy and 
resistance among nations and stakeholders. 
At this point, the attitudes and perceptions of stakeholders are not likely to change.  
Potential improvement in the process lies in the development of the implementation plans.  
As with the strategy formation, the involvement of stakeholders is key, and while this may 
have been a missed opportunity at the start of Agency Reform, it is not too late to affect the 
success of Agency Reform implementation.  A critical recommendation is the development 
of metrics to gauge the effectiveness of Agency Reform.  From the available documentation, 
this would appear to be a gap in the Agency Reform work plan and needs to be addressed 
well in advance of implementation. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
This study examined the strategic foundations of NATO’s Agency Reform efforts 
concurrent with the effort’s evolution.  A more complete story is available after Agency 
Reform has been implemented and its effectiveness evaluated.  Most of the extant 
academic literature addresses commercial industry and their efforts at strategic change.  
There are relatively little on international organizations, and NATO’s unique design as an 
international security arrangement may make it difficult to find completely applicable 
research.  A future researcher would do well to augment NATO source documents with 
structured interviews of the NART and DPPC/AR principals, senior Agency management, 
and stakeholders in Allies’ delegations to get a more complete view of Agency Reform. 
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